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1. The shortage of food and American arms in Mukden is becoming serious. The crop harvest, which is due in 20 or 30 days, should relieve the food shortage for the military personnel but not for the civilians.

2. Around 75,000 Communist troops are concentrated in the immediate area of Chinchou (121-07,41-07). In addition, there are 25,000 troops along the railroad between Chinchou and Chiense, 12 miles northeast of Shanhaikuan (119-47,40-01), and another 15,000 troops at Funing, 25 miles southwest of Shanhaikuan. The total number of Communist troops in position to attack or to support the Chinchou offensive is roughly from 175,000 to 200,000. This strength is the largest that the Communists have ever assembled to attack any Manchurian point.

3. The Nationalist strength at Chinchou is approximately 50,000, with 25,000 troops nearby at Chinhsi (120-50,40-45) and Hulutao (121-01,40-44).

4. The Nationalists in the Mukden, Hsinmin (122-48,41-59), Tiehling (123-51,42-18) area intend to attack the Communist troops in the Hsinlitun (122-08,42-01), Peichen (121-44,41-36) area with 20 divisions. The attack is scheduled for 8 October in coordination with counterattacks by the Nationalist troops in Chinchou and the drive from Hulutao to Chinchou by troops of the Nationalist 62 Army, which is arriving by sea from Chinghuangtao.

5. On 7 October the Nationalist troops south of Mukden drove south in a limited diversionary action before the start of the main plan. The Nationalist push from Mukden will employ over 100,000 troops, providing the plan is carried through. Responsibility probably will rest on the Nationalist New 1 and New 6 (American-trained) armies. The Nationalist weak point is that these two armies are equipped with American weapons and all of the available ammunition is already issued to the troops, with no supply in Mukden. Comment. Should the Nationalist plan fail it would be almost impossible for the Nationalists to hold Mukden throughout the winter.)

6. If Chinchou falls, the Communists will be free either to hold the Chinchou area and repair the railroad between there and Hsinlitun while the main

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body attacks the Mukden perimeter, or to leave a holding force around Mukden while the main body pours into North China.

25X1A  Comment. The Nationalist position in North China will be doubly precarious if Chinchou falls, as the Communists in Honan, Shansi and Shantung are already a threat to the area. It appears doubtful that both forces would concentrate in North China. The Manchurian force alone is capable of taking care of North China if the troops under General FU Tse-yi (director of North China Bandit Suppression Headquarters) are not reinforced, which would leave the Honan-Shantung Communist forces free to concentrate on Hsuehou (117-16,34-18).)

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